For many philosophers the so called combination problem is panpsychism’s Achilles’ heel. The combination problem refers to not understanding how the multitude of cells (or particles) possessing simple mentality, work together to form the complex mentality that we experience.<\/p>\n
There really is no problem at all though. We don’t seem to have a problem understanding how our complex physical properties weakly emerge from simpler forms of those properties in the cells or particles that compose us. Why on Earth then would there somehow be a problem for mental properties?<\/p>\n
This “problem” is really just a case of special pleading. Mental properties somehow inexplicably operate differently than physical properties because some philosophers simply find the idea of panpsychism distasteful.<\/p>\n
Highly integrated cells working together cause new physical capabilities to emerge just as our advanced mental capabilities emerge from cells with far simpler mental capabilities. The mind’s subjectness is akin to the body’s systemness. Either both have a combination problem or neither does.<\/p>\n
Has any actual justification ever been presented that the combination problem even exists? It does not appear so. This “problem” then is merely a dogmatic fantasy or delusion based on nothing but blind faith.<\/p>\n
The real combination problem seems to apply to anti-panpsychists. How does phenomenal experience somehow magically arise from nowhere when the right combination of particles form? This is the real question that is consistently ignored by those with a deep-seated, blindingly irrational aversion to the eminently rational position of panpsychism.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"